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A RESPONSE TO BAEV AND LEWIS
by Alexander Cooley
I am pleased to respond to the important points raised by Pavel Baev and David Lewis, both long-time
and insightful observers of Eurasia and its rapidly changing politics.
Pavel's point about the "stability paradox" (a term he might consider patenting), or how great powers
such as the United States, Russia and China actively pursue policies that ultimately undermine even their
own visions of the concept, is right on target, so I will confine myself to discussing the implications of
my argument for the post-Spring and current developments in Syria.
Rather than provide any one set of clear lessons, the Arab Spring and subsequent developments appear to
have reinforced these varying external assumptions about the determinants of "stability." In hindsight,
Western policymakers and commentators now view the 2011 upheavals as a long-term consequence of
decades of political stagnation and kleptocracy, with the Tunisian spark quickly generating regional
demonstration in other countries with these same characteristics.
But in practice, translating such hindsight into new Western policies has remained difficult. Indeed,
the US pursued dramatically different policies towards Egypt, Libya, Bahrain and Jordan, in great part
because of enduring concerns over "access stability." In Egypt, for instance, following the Egyptian
military's overthrow of President Morsi and post-coup the Obama Administration has struggled mightily
to reconcile its enduring need for security cooperation and access to Suez with its own legal guidelines,
such as the Leahy Law, mandating aid termination.
As with US policy towards Uzbekistan, the parsing of various categories of US military assistance and
activities and calls for "political engagement" in the service of encouraging incremental political reform
might facilitate internal bureaucratic policy compromises, but abroad it mostly signals confusion,
inconsistency and hypocrisy. Moreover, in Egypt, like in Central Asia, the political conditions
accompanying assistance have become weaker still given the availability of other external patrons in the
event of US aid cut-offs. As Stephen Cook of the Council on Foreign Relations has observed regarding
US military assistance to Cairo, "We allegedly have influence but we never used the lever of the
influence; so as a result we don't have any."
However, for Russia, China and the Central Asian rulers themselves, the Arab Spring was less a parable
about the long-term dangers of political decay and institutionalized corruption, and more a lesson about
the perils of social media and the perceived power of new forms of political mobilization and
coordination. Indeed, following the MENA events in 2011 both the SCO and CSTO ramped up their
capacity to "deal with social unrest" cyber-security, and intelligence cooperation. There are also
important emerging parallels between MENA-based regional security organizations like the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) and the CSTO and SCO. Like its Eurasian counterparts, GCC countries
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have signed a controversial new security pact that includes provisions for extra-territorial security
cooperation, renditions and political asylum denials, common blacklisting, and increased regional
surveillance.
David Lewis offers some thoughtful counterpoints about the relative ineffectiveness of the "liberal
peace-building" model and questions the wisdom of reflexively criticizing new Chinese and Russian
assistance to the region. On his first point, I am broadly in agreement, though with the caveat that the
various international actors that constitute the "liberal peace-building" establishment have contributed to
their own regional inefficacy by steadily paring down the very political and human rights conditions
once thought to be imperative for the success of outside interventions. David's own important research
on how the OSCE, in the interest of currying favor with the ruling regimes in Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan, gutted the political dimensions of its "police reform" projects, is a good case in point.
On the second point, David is surely right to point to some of the potential developmental benefits from
Chinese aid, investment and project financing. By almost all measures, China is now the region's leading
overall economic partner and the only external actor that is heavily investing in upgrading the region's
infrastructure, providing desperately-needed highways, railroads, energy grids and pipelines. 
But David's anecdote about Tajik truck drivers being grateful for Chinese assistance itself might reveal
some of the less obvious potential adverse consequences of Beijing's economic largess. The first
concerns the governance and management of these new infrastructures, and Beijing's reluctance to set
conditions that deter connected local elites from turning intended public works projects into vehicles for
private revenue streams. For example, just a few weeks after the Dushanbe-Chanak highway, built
mainly with $280 million of Chinese assistance, opened in 2009, a newly formed company Innovative
Highway Solutions, registered in the British Virgin Islands, began operating new tollbooths. The
company, with alleged ties to the ruling elite, has been criticized for charging excessively high fees,
while being exempt from almost all taxes in Tajikistan. In sum, the Chinese-financed project– intended
as a public good by Beijing to spur regional trade and development– has been turned into a high-cost
"club good" and private source of rents.
In criticizing aspects of Chinese assistance, I am not suggesting that regional projects managed by the
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank or the European bank for Reconstruction and Development
are not without problems, nor am I champion of Western-style conditional lending. Nevertheless,
International Financial Institutions offer some channels to address such governance concerns, whereas
China's lending terms in Central Asia remain opaque and Beijing still does not actively participate in
international donor planning and coordination.
David's call for humility form Brussels and Washington is sound advice- I couldn't agree more. But as he
and Pavel have argued in this forum and elsewhere, this is a region that seems to nurture just the
opposite, as external powers all too readily project their own grand strategic visions, assumptions and
regional blueprints. In that spirit, interrogating the "stability obsession" reveals more about the
pathologies of the external powers themselves than the polities they are intended to "stabilize."
* * *
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